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Abstract
In many countries, lenders are not permitted to use information about past defaults
after a speciﬁed period of time has elapsed. We model this provision and determine
conditions under which it is optimal.
We develop a model in which entrepreneurs must repeatedly seek external funds
to ﬁnance a sequence of risky projects under conditions of both adverse selection and
moral hazard. Forgetting a default typically makes incentives worse, ex-ante, because
it reduces the punishment for failure. However, following a default it may be good
to forget, because by improving an entrepreneur’s reputation, forgetting increases the
incentive to exert eﬀort to preserve this reputation.
Our key result is that if (i) borrowers’ incentives are suﬃciently strong, (ii) their
average quality is not too low, (iii) the output loss from low eﬀort is not too large, and
(iv) agents are suﬃciently patient, then the optimal law would prescribe some amount
of forgetting — that is, it would not permit lenders to fully utilize past information.
We also argue that forgetting must be the outcome of a regulatory intervention by the
government — no lender would willingly agree to ignore information available to him.
Finally, we show that the predictions of our model are consistent with the cross-country
relationship between credit bureau reporting regulations and the provision of credit,
as well as Musto (2004)’s evidence on the impact of these regulations on individual
borrower and lender behavior.
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In studying the “fresh start” provisions of personal bankruptcy law, economists typically
focus on the forgiveness of debts. However, another important feature is the forgetting of
past defaults. In many countries, lenders are not permitted to use information about past
defaults after a speciﬁed period of time has elapsed.
In the United States, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) prescribes that a personal
bankruptcy ﬁling may be reported by credit bureaus for up to ten years, after which it must
be removedfrom the records made available to lenders.1 Similarprovisions exist in most other
countries. In ﬁgure 1 we summarize the distribution of credit bureau regulations governing
the time period of information transmission across countries.2 Of the 113 countries with
credit bureaus as of January 2007, over 90 percent of them had provisions for restricting the
reporting of adverse information after a certain period of time. Also note that this fraction
has remained stable over time, even as countries have set up credit bureaus for the ﬁrst time
(twelve countries introduced bureaus from 2003 to 2007).3
Diﬀerences in information-sharing regimes across countries — whether a credit-reporting
system exists, and whether there are time limits on reporting past defaults — are associated
with diﬀerences in the provision of credit. In ﬁgure 2 we graph the average ratio of Private
Credit to GDP according to whether the country restricts the time period of information
sharing. Countries with no information sharing at all (i.e. no credit bureau) have low levels
of credit; this is well-established and will be discussed below. On the other hand, it is
interesting to note that countries in which defaults are always reported tend to have lower
provision of credit than those countries in which defaults are not reported (“erased”) after
a certain period of time.4
Musto (2004) studies the eﬀect of these provisions on lenders and individual borrowers,
using U.S. data. He shows that (i) these restrictions are binding — access to credit increases
signiﬁcantly when the bankruptcy “ﬂag” is dropped from credit ﬁles;5 and (ii) these indi-
1Other derogatory information can be reported for a maximum of seven years; see Hunt (2006) for a
discussion of the history and regulation of consumer credit bureaus in the United States. This time period
is often even shorter in other countries; Jappelli and Pagano (2004) report several speciﬁc examples.
2Source: Doing Business Database, World Bank, 2004 and 2008. Throughout, we use the term ”credit
bureau” to refer both to private credit bureaus, as well as public credit registries.
3See also Jappelli and Pagano (2006).
4Private credit/GDP is constructed from the IMF International Financial Statistics for year-end 2006. As
in Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007), private credit is given by lines 22d and 42d (claims on the private
sector by commercial banks and other ﬁnancial institutions). The credit bureau regulations are current as
of January 2007 (source: Doing Business database 2008).
5That is, after 10 years. This eﬀect is most signiﬁcant for former bankrupts who are relatively creditwor-
2Figure 1: Credit Bureau Policies over Time
Figure 2: Impact of Information-Sharing Regime on Provision of Credit
3viduals who subsequently obtain new credit are subsequently likelier to default than those
with similar credit scores (and thus their credit scores tend to decline in the future). He
interprets this as evidence that these laws are suboptimal.
In this paper we analyze these restrictions on reporting past defaults in the framework of
a model of repeated borrowing and lending, and determine conditions under which they are
optimal. Our model will also be consistent with many of these stylized facts. In particular,
we consider a model in which entrepreneurs must repeatedly seek external funds to ﬁnance
a sequence of risky projects under conditions of both adverse selection and moral hazard.
We have in mind a world of small entrepreneurs who ﬁnance their business ventures with
loans for which they are personally liable.6 In this setup, an entrepreneur’s reputation, or
credit history, as captured by the past history of successes and failures of his projects, can
encourage him to exert high eﬀort.
In a typical equilibrium of the model, however, reputation may not be eﬃcacious until
agents have accumulated a suﬃciently good credit history to make default unattractive.
Conversely, those agents who fail will have a poor reputation — and hence weak incentives
— and so will not be able to obtain ﬁnancing.
We then consider the impact of restricting the availability to lenders of information on
entrepreneurs’ past defaults. Such a restriction leads to a tradeoﬀ in our model. On the
one hand, “forgetting” a default makes incentives weaker, ex-ante, because it reduces the
punishment from failure. On the other hand, forgetting a default improves an entrepreneur’s
reputation, ex-post. This allows him to obtain ﬁnancing when he otherwise would not be
able to. Moreover, this improvement in his reputation also strengthens incentives, and may
induce him to exert a higher level of eﬀort than in the absence of forgetting. Our key result
is that if (i) borrowers’ incentives are suﬃciently strong, (ii) their average risk-type is not
too low, (iii) the output loss from low eﬀort is not too large, and (iv) agents are suﬃciently
patient, then welfare is higher in the presence of a limited amount of forgetting, that is, by
restricting the information available to lenders on borrowers’ credit history. We also argue
that forgetting must be the outcome of a regulatory intervention by the government — no
lender would willingly agree to ignore the information available to him.
The eﬀects of “forgetting” on lenders’ and individual borrowers’ behavior in our model
are consistent with the empirical evidence presented by Musto (2004). However, we argue
thy; dropping the bankruptcy ﬂag has little eﬀect for those with many other derogatory indicators in their
credit ﬁle.
6And indeed, Avery et al (1998) use the NSSBF and SCF to show that “[l]oanswith personal commitments
comprise a majority of small business loans.”
4that these restrictions may be optimal. In addition, our results on the relation between
presence of a forgetting clause and the aggregate volume of credit are consistent with the
international evidence reported above.
In the Congressional debate surrounding the adoption of the FCRA (U.S. House, 1970
and U.S. Senate, 1969), the following arguments were put forward in favor of forgetting
past defaults: (i) if information was not erased the stigmatized individual would not obtain
a “fresh start” and so would be unable to continue as a productive member of society,
(ii) old information might be less reliable or salient, and (iii) limited computer storage
capacity. On the other hand, the arguments raised against forgetting this information were
(i) it discourages borrowers from repaying their debts by reducing the penalty for failure,
(ii) it increases the chance of costly fraud or other crimes by making it harder to identify
(and exclude) seriously bad risks, (iii) it could lead to a tightening of credit policies (which
would aﬀect the worst risks disproportionately), and ﬁnally, (iv) it forces honest borrowers to
subsidize the dishonest ones. We will show that our model captures many of these arguments,
and will use it to assess the tradeoﬀs between the positive and negative eﬀects of forgetting.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we present the model and the strategy sets
of the entrepreneurs and lenders. In the following section we show that a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium of the model exists, characterize the properties of the equilibrium strategies,
and show that this equilibrium is eﬃcient. In section IV we study the eﬀects of introducing
a forgetting clause on equilibrium outcomes and welfare. We derive conditions under which
forgetting a default can be socially optimal — and relate them to the empirical evidence and
the policy debate surrounding the adoption of the FCRA. Section V provides examples that
illustrate these results. We consider an extension of the model in section VI. Section VII
concludes, and the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Previous Literature
Our basic model is one of reputation and incentives, like those of Diamond (1989), Mailath
and Samuelson (2001), and Fishman and Rob (2005). In these models, principals and agents
interact repeatedly under conditions of both adverse selection and moral hazard. The equi-
librium in our model shares many similarities with the ones in these papers, in that agents
build reputations over time. There are nevertheless some diﬀerences between our model and
theirs — in both the setting, and in the structure of markets and information — which are
discussed below.
The positive eﬀects that a credit bureau can have through increasing the information pub-
5licly available on borrowers’ histories have been widely discussed. One noteworthy paper that
focuses on lenders’ incentives to voluntarily share information is Pagano and Jappelli (1993).
In recent empirical work, Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) and Brown, Jappelli, and
Pagano (2007) have found that credit bureaus are positively associated with increased credit.
Our main focus, however, is on the possible beneﬁts of limiting the information available
on borrowers’ past histories. This has also been explored in a few other papers. Padilla and
Pagano (2000) show, in the framework of a two-period model, that it may be optimal to
restrict the type of information shared, because if information about an agent’s type is too
precise, then a borrower’s eﬀort choice will have no eﬀect on his reputation; this eliminates
the incentive to exert eﬀort. This eﬀect is also important in our model. Vercammen (1995)
also presents an example in a dynamic setting that suggests that the optimal policy might
involve restricting the memory of a credit bureau.
Another implication of restricting the availability of information on agents’ past behavior
is that this may aﬀect the punishments a principal can impose on an agent. This eﬀect
has been explored by Cr´ emer (1995), who shows that when the principal cannot commit
not to renegotiate, then using an ineﬃcient monitoring technology can sometimes improve
incentives, because it limits the potential for renegotiation, and hence allows for stronger
punishments. By contrast, in our model forgetting facilitates ﬁnancing after failures, thereby
making punishments weaker.
Finally, while we consider the eﬀect of restricting credit histories on entrepreneurs’ incen-
tives and access to credit, Chatterjee, Corbae and Rios-Rull (2007) explore the risk-sharing
and redistributive impact of these laws on consumers.
II The Model
Consider an economy made up of a continuum (of unit mass) of risk-neutral entrepreneurs,
who live forever and discount the future at the rate β ≤ 1. In each period t =0 ,1,...
an entrepreneur receives a new project, which requires one unit of ﬁnancing in order to be
undertaken. This project yields either R (success) or 0 (failure). Output is non-storable,
so entrepreneurs must seek external ﬁnancing in each period. In addition, there is limited
liability, so if a project fails in the current period, then the entrepreneur is not required to
make payments out of any future income.
We assume that there are two types of entrepreneurs. There is a set of measure p0 ∈ (0,1)
of riskless agents, whose projects always succeed (i.e., their return is R with probability
6one),7 and a set of risky agents, with measure 1 − p0, for whom the project may fail with
some positive probability. The returns on the risky agents’ projects are independently and
identically distributed among them. The success probability of a risky agent depends on
his eﬀort choice. He may choose to exert high eﬀort (h), at a cost c>0 (in units of the
consumption good), in which case the success probability will be πh ∈ (0,1). Alternatively,
he may choose to exert low eﬀort. Low eﬀort (l) is costless, but the success probability under
low eﬀort is only πl ∈ (0,πh).
We assume:
Assumption 1. πhR − 1 >c , πlR<1;
i.e., the project has a positive NPV if high eﬀort is exerted (even when the cost of exerting
high eﬀort is taken into account), while it has a negative NPV under low eﬀort.
In addition, we require the cost of eﬀort c to be suﬃciently high, so that entrepreneurs
face a nontrivial incentive problem. The following condition implies that high eﬀort cannot
be implemented in the absence of reputational incentives (e.g. in a static framework) when
the entrepreneur is known for certain to be risky.
Assumption 2. c
πh−πl >R− 1/πh
Finally, we introduce one further parameter restriction, requiring that πh and πl not be
too far apart. This condition is used to ensure the existence of an equilibrium.
Assumption 3. π2
h ≤ πl
In addition to entrepreneurs, there are lenders, who provide external funding to en-
trepreneurs in the loan market. More speciﬁcally, we assume that in each period there are N
proﬁt-maximizing risk-neutral lenders (where N is large) who compete among themselves on
the terms of the contracts oﬀered to borrowers. Each lender lives only a single period, and is
replaced by a new lender in the following period. Since lenders live only a single period, they
cannot write long-term contracts.8 This is consistent with actual practice in U.S. unsecured
credit markets, where borrowers often switch between lenders.
A contract is then simply described by the interest rate r at which an entrepreneur is
oﬀered one unit of ﬁnancing at the beginning of a period (if the entrepreneur is not oﬀered
ﬁnancing in this period then we set r = ∅). If the project succeeds, the entrepreneur makes
the required interest payment r to the lender. On the other hand, if the project fails, the
7We discuss the role that this assumption plays in remark 5 below.
8This assumption is discussed further in Remark 3 below.
7entrepreneur is unable to make any payment (since there is no storage) and we assume that
the debt that was incurred is forgiven, i.e., discharged. Since borrowers have no funds to
repay lenders other than the proceeds from their project in this period, with no loss of
generality r can be taken to lie in [0,R] ∪∅ .
We assume that an entrepreneur’s type, as well as the eﬀort he undertakes, is his private
information. Furthermore, since under Assumption 1 it is only proﬁtable to lend to a risky
agent if he exerts high eﬀort, there is also incentive problem: a risky entrepreneur may in
fact prefer to exert low eﬀort even though the total surplus in that case is lower (indeed
negative). The loan market is thus characterized by the presence of both adverse selection
and moral hazard.
At the same time, in a dynamic framework such as the one we consider, the history
of past ﬁnancing decisions and past outcomes of the projects of an agent may convey some
information regarding the agent’s type. In addition, this history will also aﬀect his incentives.
Since lenders do not live beyond the current period, we assume that there is a credit bureau
that records this information in every period and makes it available to future lenders.
Let σi
t denote the credit history of agent i ∈ [0,1] at date t, describing for each previous
period τ<twhether the agent’s project was funded and if so, whether it succeeded or failed.
Hence, denoting by S a success, F a failure, and ∅ the event where the project is not funded
(either because the agent is not oﬀered ﬁnancing or because he does not accept any oﬀers),
σi
t is given by a sequence of elements out of {S,F,∅} : σi
t ∈ Σt ≡{ S,F,∅}
t.
We show below that only pooling equilibria can exist in this economy;9 that is, lenders are
unable to separate borrowers by oﬀering a menu of contracts to entrepreneurs with the same
credit history. Note, however, that they may optimally choose to diﬀerentiate the terms of
the contracts oﬀered on the basis of entrepreneurs’ credit histories. Hence, without loss of
generality we can focus our attention on the case where a lender oﬀers a single contract r(σt)
to borrowers with a given credit history σt. We let C(σt) denote the set of contracts oﬀered
at date t by the N lenders to entrepreneurs with credit history σt, and let Ct ≡∪ t,σt∈ΣtC(σt)
be the set of contracts oﬀered by lenders for any possible history up to date t.
We assume that while lenders present at date t know Ct, i.e., the set of contracts which
were oﬀered to borrowers in the past, they do not know the particular contracts which were
chosen by an individual borrower. This in line with actual practice; while credit bureaus
do not report the actual contracts adopted by individual borrowers, the set of contracts
generally oﬀered to borrowers is available from databases such as “Comperemedia”.
9To be precise, we focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria, and show that these must be pooling.
8As discussed earlier, the focus of our paper is the eﬀect of restrictions on the transmission
of credit bureau records. We model the forgetting policy in this economy as follows: when
an entrepreneur’s project fails, with probability q the credit bureau ignores the failure and
updates the entrepreneur’s record as if his project succeeded in that period.10 That is, S
now represents either a success or a failure that is forgotten, and F represents a failure that
has not been forgotten. The parameter q ∈ [0,1] then describes the forgetting policy in the
economy. Note that we take q as being ﬁxed over time, which is in line with existing laws.
We adopt this representation of forgetting to make the analysis simpler, though it is
somewhat diﬀerent from existing institutions. In practice, defaults are erased with the
passage of time, rather than probabilistically. We intend to argue however that the eﬀects
on borrowers’ incentives and access to credit are similar; in particular, that the consequences
of higher values of q are analogous to those of allowing for a shorter period until negative
information is forgotten.11
The timeline of a single period is then as follows. Each entrepreneur must obtain a loan
of 1 unit in the market in order to undertake his project. Lenders simultaneously the rate
at which they are willing to lend in this period to an agent with a given credit history, and
do this for all possible credit histories at that date. If an entrepreneur is oﬀered ﬁnancing,
and if he chooses to be ﬁnanced, he undertakes the project (funds lent cannot be diverted to
consumption), and if he is risky he also chooses his eﬀort level. The outcome of the project
is then realized: if the project succeeds the entrepreneur uses the revenue R of the project to
make the required payment r to the lender, while if the project fails the entrepreneur defaults
and makes no payment (since his default is forgiven). Note that — purely for convenience
— we assume that entrepreneurs repay at the end of the same period in which they borrow.
The credit history of the entrepreneur is then updated. If the project was ﬁnanced, a S
is added to the sequence if the project succeeded in the period (or, with probability q, if it
failed), and a F otherwise. If the project was not ﬁnanced then a ∅ is added. This timeline
is illustrated in the ﬁgure 3 for the case of high and low eﬀort (when q = 0).
Next period, the same sequence is repeated: for each updated credit history, lenders
choose the contracts they will oﬀer, each entrepreneur then freely chooses the best contract
among the ones he is oﬀered,12 and so on for every t.
Since the updated credit history may aﬀect the contracts the agent will get in the future,
10A similar approach is also taken by Padilla and Pagano (2000).
11This is indeed exactly so for the polar cases of q = 0, which implies that a failure is remembered forever,
and q = 1, which is equivalent to forgetting immediately, i.e., not keeping any record of failures.
12We assume entrepreneurs are unable to commit to any future choice of contract.
9Figure 3: Timeline: q =0
and hence his future expected utility, and since for a risky agent such history is partly aﬀected
by his current eﬀort choice, this will aﬀect the agent’s incentives to choose high versus low
eﬀort. In particular, the agent may care for having a good credit history (i.e., a good
reputation), as this might improve his future funding prospects, and this may strengthen the
agent’s incentives with respect to the case of a static contracting problem. Indeed, we will
show that incentives may be suﬃciently poor that we need reputational eﬀects to elicit high
eﬀort (and as a result ﬁnancing cannot take place at all nodes).
To summarize, a lender’s strategy consists in the choice of contract to oﬀer to en-
trepreneurs at any given date, for any possible credit history. The strategy of an entrepreneur
speciﬁes, in every period and for every possible credit history, the choice of the contract
among the ones he is oﬀered and, if the entrepreneur is risky, also his choice of eﬀort.
To evaluate the expected proﬁt of a loan oﬀered to an entrepreneur with credit history
σt, an important role is played a lender’s belief p(σt), that the entrepreneur is a safe type.13
At the initial date such belief is given by the prior probability p0. The belief is then updated
over time on the basis of the knowledge of the credit history σt as well as of the contracts
Ct oﬀered up to such date, and of the entrepreneurs’ borrowing and eﬀort strategies, as we
describe in detail below. We will term p(σt) the credit score of the entrepreneur.
13We will sometimes drop the reference to the borrower’s credit history and refer simply to p.
10III Equilibrium
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium
In what follows we will focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) in which players’ strategies
depend on past events only through credit scores. A key appeal of such equilibria is not
only that players’ strategies are simpler, but also that they resemble actual practice in
consumer credit markets, where many lending decisions are conditioned on credit scores,
most notably the “FICO score” developed by Fair Isaac and Company. In addition, we will
discuss below the diﬀerences between MPE and other equilibria and argue that in the latter
players’ behavior is less plausible.14
In particular, we will establish the existence and analyze the properties of symmetric,
sequential MPE, where all agents of a given type (i.e., all lenders, or all safe entrepreneurs,
or all risky entrepreneurs with the same credit score) optimally choose the same strategies.
In addition, the restriction to sequential equilibrium means that beliefs are determined by
Bayes’ Rule whenever possible and, when this is not possible, beliefs must be consistent.W e
can now describe players’ strategies more formally for the Markov Perfect Equilibria that we
consider.
Let C(p) denote the collection of contracts r oﬀered by lenders in equilibrium to en-
trepreneurs with credit score p.
The strategy of an entrepreneur, whatever his type, consists in the choice, for every
credit score p he may have, and given that he is oﬀered a set of contracts C0, whether or
not to accept any of the loan contracts oﬀered, and if so, which one to accept. For the
safe entrepreneurs we denote this choice by rs(p,C0) ∈C 0 ∪∅ , and for the risky by rr(p,C0).
In addition, a risky entrepreneur has to choose the eﬀort level er(p,C0) he exerts. We will
allow for mixed strategies with regard to eﬀort and hence denote the eﬀort level by e ∈ [0,1],
where e signiﬁes the probability with which the entrepreneur exerts high eﬀort.15 Thus e =1
corresponds to a pure strategy of high (h) eﬀort, e = 0 to a pure strategy of low (l) eﬀort,
and e =1 /2 (for example) corresponds to mixing between high and low eﬀort with equal
probability.
Since an entrepreneur’s choice depends not only on his immediate payoﬀ (which depends
on the current contract), but also on how his project outcome will aﬀect the contracts he
14Restricting attention to MPE to rule out implausible equilibria is common in the analysis of reputation
games; see Mailath and Samuelson (2001), for example.
15This is the only form of mixed strategies that we allow; we demonstrate below that mixing only occurs
for at most a single period along the equilibrium path.
11is oﬀered in the future, we need to specify how lenders update their beliefs concerning the
agent’s type in light of the outcome of the current project.
Let pS(p,C0) specify how lenders update their beliefs in case of success (or forgotten
failure) of the project of a borrower with credit score p and facing current contracts C0.
Analogously, pF(p,C0) denotes the updated belief in case of a failure (which is not forgotten)
and p∅(p,C0) when the entrepreneur is not ﬁnanced.16 The updated beliefs will be computed
according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible; when this is not possible they will be required
to be consistent in the Sequential Perfect Equilibrium sense.
Observation 1. Since only risky agents can fail, we must have pF(p,C0) = 0 for any p and
C0 6= ∅.
Furthermore, when entrepreneurs are not oﬀered any loan (C0 = ∅) and hence are not ﬁ-
nanced, it is immediate that beliefs remain unchanged: p∅(p,∅)=p for all p.
We are now ready to write the formal choice problem for the entrepreneurs. Each period
they have to choose which of the oﬀered loan contracts to accept, if any, and their eﬀort
level. Let vr(p,C0) denote the maximal discounted expected utility that a risky entrepreneur
with credit score p, facing a set of contracts C0, can obtain, given the lenders’ updating rules
pS(·),p F(·),p ∅(·) and their strategies C(·), determining future oﬀers of contracts (to simplify
the notation we do not make the dependence of vr on these terms explicit). Observe that
vr(·) is recursively deﬁned as the solution to the following problem:
vr(p,C0)=m a x e∈[0,1],r∈C0∪∅

    
    
(eπh +( 1− e)πl)(R − r) − ec
+β[e(πh +( 1− πh)q)+(1− e)(πl +( 1− πl)q)]vr(pS,C(pS))
+β[(e(1− πh)+(1− e)(1− πl)][1− q]vr(0,C(0)), if r 6= ∅;
βvr(p∅,C(p∅)), if r = ∅.
(1)
When the agent is ﬁnanced (r 6= ∅), the ﬁrst line in (1) represents the expected payoﬀ from
the current project, the second the discounted continuation utility when the project succeeds,
and the third line gives the discounted continuation utility following failure. Note that in
writing this expression we have used the fact that, by Observation 1, pF(·) = 0. When
the agent is not ﬁnanced (r = ∅), then his utility is simply the discounted utility of being
ﬁnanced next period, with his credit score appropriately updated. We denote the solution
of problem (1) by er(p,C0),r r(p,C0), which describes the risky entrepreneur’s strategy as p
and C0 vary.
Analogously, letting vs(p,C0) be the maximal discounted expected utility for a safe en-







R − r + βvs(pS,C(pS)) if r 6= ∅;
βvs(p∅,C(p∅)), if r = ∅.
(2)
The solution to this problem is denoted by rs(p,C0).
Since lenders cannot observe the speciﬁc contract chosen by an individual borrower in
any given period, but only whether or not he was ﬁnanced, we have:
Observation 2. Whenever an entrepreneur accepts ﬁnancing, he will choose the contract with
the lowest interest rate: i.e., for all p,C0 we have rj(p,C0) ∈ min(C0) ∪∅ , for j = s,r.
Next, we determine the expected proﬁts for an arbitrary lender n from a loan with interest
rate r oﬀered to a unit mass of entrepreneurs with credit score p, given the entrepreneurs’
strategies, rs(·),r r(·), and er(·), and the contracts C−n oﬀered by the other lenders. The
expression for lender n’s proﬁts will depend on which types of entrepreneurs accept his oﬀer
(if any):
1. No entrepreneur accepts the oﬀer. This will be the case either if he oﬀers no contract, or
if his oﬀer is higher than the lowest contract oﬀered by other lenders (observation 2), or if
both types’ strategies are to reject all oﬀers on the table. In this case his proﬁt will be zero.
More formally:
Π(r,p,C−n,r s(·),r r(·),e r(·)) = 0,
if either r>min(C−n), or r = ∅, or rs(p,C−n ∪ r)=∅ and rr(p,C−n ∪ r)=∅.
(3)
2. Only safe entrepreneurs accept. If the risky types reject all oﬀers on the table, then
his proﬁt is determined by payments from the safe entrepreneurs, who have measure p.I n
order for his oﬀer to be accepted, however, it must be at least as low as all of the lenders’
contracts. In addition, he must share the proﬁts with other lenders oﬀering r (if any); we
let #(rn0
∈C −n s.t. rn0
= r) denote the number of other such lenders. So his proﬁt is given
by:
Π(r,p,C−n,r s(·),r r(·),e r(·)) = pr/[1+ #(rn0
∈C −n s.t. rn0
= r)],
if r ≤ min(C−n),r s(p,C−n ∪ r) 6= ∅, and rr(p,C−n ∪ r)=∅
(4)
3. Only risky entrepreneurs accept. Similarly, if the safe types reject all oﬀers on the table,
then his proﬁt accrues from the risky entrepreneurs. In this case, the proﬁt also depends
on the risky entrepreneurs’ eﬀort choice er(p,C−n ∪ r)). Recall that er(·) = 0 corresponds
to their exerting low eﬀort, in which case their success probability is πl, that er(·)=1
corresponds to high eﬀort, with success probability πh, and that er(·) ∈ (0,1) corresponds
13to mixing over high and low eﬀort with probability er(·). We have:
Π(r,p,C−n,r s(·),r r(·),e r(·)) =
(1− p){er(p,C−n ∪ r)πh +( 1− er(p,C−n ∪ r))πl}r/[1+ #(rn0
∈C −n s.t. rn0
= r)],
if r ≤ min(C−n) and rs(p,C−n ∪ r)=∅, and rr(p,C−n ∪ r) 6= ∅
(5)
4. All entrepreneurs accept. This will be the case along the equilibrium path. Then his
proﬁt will simply be the sum of (4) and (5), and we have:
Π(r,p,C−n,r s(·),r r(·),e r(·)) =
{p +( 1− p)[er(p,C−n ∪ r)πh +( 1− er(p,C−n ∪ r))πl]}r/[1+ #(rn ∈C −n s.t. rn = r)],
if r ≤ min(C−n), and rS(p,C−n ∪ r) 6= ∅, and rr(p,C−n ∪ r) 6= ∅
(6)
Since a lender lives only a single period, his objective is to choose r so as to maximize his
expected proﬁts given by (3)-(6). Given our focus on symmetric MPE, we can denote the
solution simply by r(p).
We are now ready to give a formal deﬁnition of a MPE:
Deﬁnition 1. A symmetric, sequential Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a collection of strate-
gies (r(·),r s(·),r r(·),e r(·)) and beliefs p(·), such that:
• Lenders maximize proﬁts, given rs(·),r r(·),e r(·): for every p, r = r(p) maximizes (3)-
(6), when C−n = r(p);
• Entrepreneurs’ strategies are sequentially rational. That is,
– for all p,C0,( rr(p,C0),e r(p,C0)) solves (1) when C(p)=r(p).
– for all p,C0, rs(p,C0) solves (2) when C(p)=r(p).
• Beliefs are computed via Bayes’ Rule whenever possible and are consistent otherwise.
Observe that along the equilibrium path, strategies and beliefs can be written solely as
functions of the credit score p, i.e., r(p),r r(p),r s(p),C(p) and {pS(p),p F(p),p ∅(p)}. Similarly,
entrepreneurs’ discounted expected utility can be written as vs(p),vr(p).
The following notation will also be useful. Let rzp(p,e) denote the lowest interest rate
consistent with lenders’ expected proﬁts being non-negative on a loan to entrepreneurs with




p +( 1− p)(eπh +( 1− e)πl)
. (7)
14Also let pNF ≡
1−πlR
(1−πl)R denote the lowest value of p for which this break-even rate is admissible
when the risky entrepreneurs exert low eﬀort, i.e. rzp(pNF,0) = R.
B Existence and Characterization of Equilibrium
The following proposition establishes that a Markov Perfect Equilibrium exists, and charac-
terizes its properties. The proof is constructive, and we show in the subsequent proposition
that this equilibrium is the most eﬃcient MPE.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1-3, a (symmetric, sequential) Markov Perfect Equilib-
rium always exists with the following properties:
i. Entrepreneurs never refuse ﬁnancing, and always take the contract with the lowest
interest rate oﬀered to them: rs(p,C0)=rr(p,C0) = min(C0), whenever C0 6= ∅.I f a
borrower does refuse ﬁnancing, lenders’ beliefs are that he is the risky type: p∅(p,C0)=
0 whenever C0 6= ∅.
ii. Lenders make zero proﬁts in equilibrium: either r(p)=rzp(p,er(p)),o rr(p)=∅.
iii. Lenders never oﬀer ﬁnancing to entrepreneurs known to be risky with probability 1:
r(0) = ∅, and so vr(0) = 0.




πh−πl, then an entrepreneur will be ﬁnanced if and only if p ≥ pNF,






1−β(πl+(1−πl)q), there exists 0 <p l ≤ pm ≤ ph < 1 such that:
- there is ﬁnancing if and only if p ≥ pl
- risky entrepreneurs exert high eﬀort if p ≥ ph, low eﬀort if p ∈ [pl,p m), and mix
between high and low eﬀort for p ∈ [pm,p h) (with er(p) strictly increasing for




1−β(πl+(1−πl)q), then there is ﬁnancing for all p>0, and risky entrepreneurs
exert high eﬀort (er(p)=1 ) .
15When c is high (region a.), incentives are weak, and the risky entrepreneurs exert low
eﬀort whenever they are ﬁnanced. Nevertheless, ﬁnancing can still obtain as long as p is not
too low (p>p NF), since there are enough safe entrepreneurs with credit score p from which
the lenders can recoup their losses on lending to the risky agents. By contrast, when c is
low (region c.) incentives are strong enough that the risky entrepreneurs exert high eﬀort
for all p>0. This makes ﬁnancing proﬁtable for all p>0. Finally, for intermediate values
of c (region b.), incentives depend on p. When p is suﬃciently high (p ≥ pm), interest rates
(both current and future) are low, which makes incentives strong enough that high eﬀort
can be sustained. By contrast, when p<p m interest rates are not suﬃciently low to sustain
high eﬀort. Moreover, when p is particularly low (p<p l) it is not feasible for lenders to
break even, just as in region a.; therefore there will be no ﬁnancing.
Recall that Markov Perfect Equilibrium requires that lenders use Bayes’ Rule to update





p +( 1− p)[er(p,C0)(πh +( 1− πh)q)+( 1− er(p,C0))(πl +( 1− πl)q)]
,
for all p,C0 6= ∅. From Observation 1, it follows that when agents fail they are known to
be risky: pF(p,C0) = 0, for C0 6= ∅. And when lenders do not oﬀer ﬁnancing then beliefs
are unchanged: p∅(p,C0)=p when C0 = ∅. When borrowers refuse ﬁnancing, which only
happens oﬀ the equilibrium path, Bayes’ Rule cannot be applied. In this case, Property i. of
the Proposition speciﬁes that lenders’ beliefs are that the borrower is risky, and the proof of
the Proposition veriﬁes that this is a consistent belief, and that under such beliefs refusing
ﬁnancing is not optimal.17
In Figure 4 we plot where regions a., b., and c. lie, in the space of possible values of the
eﬀort cost c. Figure 5 then illustrates the equilibrium outcomes obtained in region b., for
diﬀerent values of the credit score p. Recall that 0 <p l ≤ pm ≤ ph < 1, so the low-eﬀort and
mixing regions may be empty, while the high-eﬀort and no-ﬁnancing regions must always
exist for this case.
In proving the Proposition, we ﬁrst establish property iii. — that entrepreneurs who are
known to be risky are never ﬁnanced — and show that this is actually a general property of
Markov equilibria. The basic intuition is that once an entrepreneur is known to be risky, his
17Our result is robust to other speciﬁcations of the beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path. In particular, even if
lenders were to keep their beliefs unchanged when an entrepreneur refuses an equilibrium oﬀer of ﬁnancing
(i.e., p∅(p,r(p)) = p), it would never be optimal for any type of entrepreneur to refuse ﬁnancing. And even
for oﬀers of contracts oﬀ-the-equilibrium path (i.e., C0 diﬀerent from r(p)), Assumption 3 would ensure that
the safe entrepreneurs do not want to refuse ﬁnancing when p∅(p,C0)=p.
16Figure 4: Equilibrium regions
Figure 5: MPE for region b.
17continuation utility in a Markov Perfect Equilibrium is not aﬀected by the outcome of his
project, which makes it impossible to provide him with incentives to exert high eﬀort.
Lemma 1. Under assumptions 1 and 2, any Markov Perfect Equilibrium is characterized by
no ﬁnancing when p =0 : i.e., r(0) = ∅ and hence vr(0) = 0.
This result implies that, in equilibrium, any entrepreneur who fails is excluded forever from
ﬁnancing (unless this failure is “forgotten”).
Note that all symmetric MPE are pooling, by deﬁnition, since we have restricted lenders
to oﬀering a single contract to entrepreneurs with a given credit score p. We now show that
this restriction is not binding, and, in particular, that separating Markov Perfect Equilibrium
cannot exist.
Lemma 2. Suppose lenders may oﬀer multiple contracts to entrepreneurs with a given credit
score p. Then any (symmetric, sequential) Markov Perfect Equilibrium must be a pooling
equilibrium.
This result is a consequence of the fact that, by Lemma 1, risky entrepreneurs who are
separated would not be able to obtain ﬁnancing.
The rest of the proof of Proposition 1 (in the Appendix) establishes the remaining prop-
erties (i. and ii.) of the MPE, and the speciﬁc characteristics of the equilibrium we construct
for the parameter regions a., b., and c.
Finally, we establish that the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 is also the MPE
that maximizes welfare. The welfare criterion we consider in this paper is the total surplus
generated by entrepreneurs’ projects that are ﬁnanced; given agents’ risk-neutrality, this
is equivalent to the sum of the discounted expected utilities of all agents in the economy,
including lenders.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 is the most eﬃcient MPE.18
To prove the result, we ﬁrst show that the construction of the equilibrium in Proposition 1
guarantees that the equilibrium implements the highest possible eﬀort at any p. For credit
scores p ≥ ph the equilibrium of Proposition 1 then clearly maximizes welfare, since high
eﬀort will be exerted in the current period, as well as in any future round of ﬁnancing. The
same is also true for p<p m, as in the equilibrium of Proposition 1 the risky entrepreneurs
18When q ∈ (0,1) we require an additional condition to prove this result: πl ≥ πh
q
1+q. This condition is
implied by Assumption 3 when πh ≥ 1/2.
18exert low eﬀort if ﬁnanced, and this is the maximal eﬀort level. The result is completed by
showing this is true even when p ∈ [pm,p h), i.e. in the mixing region of Proposition 1.
We conclude this section with several remarks concerning the robustness of our results
to some of the assumptions.
Remark 1. (Only Risky Agents Fail) In our setup, when an entrepreneur fails he is identiﬁed
as risky and in that case can no longer obtain ﬁnancing (since he would always exert low
eﬀort). This is a consequence of the fact that only risky entrepreneurs can fail; this as-
sumption obviously simpliﬁes the analysis. If “safe” agents could also fail, then the posterior
following a failure would be above 0 and so could result in continued ﬁnancing. This is shown
in section VI, where we provide an example in which failure can indeed result in continued
ﬁnancing. We show in that case that the eﬀect of forgetting is nevertheless qualitatively
similar to that obtained here; i.e., forgetting may still improve welfare.
Remark 2. (Non-Markov Equilibria) Observe that the Markov property of players’ strategies
only binds at nodes where the entrepreneur is not ﬁnanced, for example when p = 0 after a
failure. This is because when the agent is ﬁnanced the updated belief in case of success will
always be higher than the prior one, so p never hits the same value twice.
At non-Markov equilibria, by contrast, lenders’ strategies may not be the same each time
p is equal to zero. For example, the agent may continue to be ﬁnanced the ﬁrst time he fails,
as well as at any successor node as long as his project succeeds, but permanently denied
ﬁnancing after a second failure. This threat of exclusion after two failures could be enough
to induce high eﬀort and hence to make ﬁnancing proﬁtable for lenders.
Since these strategies imply that the entrepreneur is not treated identically at diﬀerent
nodes with p = 0, they require some coordination among lenders. Such an equilibrium
thus seems somewhat fragile, being open to the possibility of breakdowns in coordination,
or to renegotiation (which is not the case for the MPE we consider). Moreover, while such
non-Markov equilibria have some similarities with the MPE with forgetting, in that a risky
entrepreneur who fails may obtain additional periods of ﬁnancing, they only exist for a
limited set of parameter values — when c is low and lies in region c. of Proposition 1, so
that incentives are suﬃciently strong. By contrast, with forgetting ﬁnancing with high eﬀort
obtains also for intermediate values of c (lying in region b.) This is because forgetting a
failure in our setup entails pooling the risky types with the safe entrepreneurs anew, so that
ﬁnancing is granted at a lower interest rate than if their type had been revealed, and this
improves their incentives (see also Proposition 4 below).
Remark 3. (Long-term Contracts) It is also useful to compare the MPE we consider with
19the equilibria we would obtain with long-term contracts, assuming that lenders live forever,
rather than a single period. In this case lenders only need to break-even over their life-time,
and not period-by-period. This would lead to rather extreme and unrealistic contracts in
equilibrium, since the equilibrium contract would postpone any net revenue from the projects
ﬁnanced as far into the future as possible, so as to minimize the cross-subsidy from safe to
risky entrepreneurs (the beneﬁt to safe entrepreneurs would be that fewer risky entrepreneurs
survive to share in the future surplus). That is, the interest payments would be equal to R
in the initial periods, and subsequently zero. We conjecture that such an equilibrium, while
preferred by the safe entrepreneurs, would be less eﬃcient (total surplus will be lower) than
that considered in Proposition 1, because of the negative eﬀect that postponing payments
has on incentives.
If the Markov property were also relaxed, a separating equilibrium might obtain. The
reason is that the risky entrepreneurs might be able to obtain some ﬁnancing if separated,19
and the postponement of payments might make the safe entrepreneurs’ contract unattractive
to the risky entrepreneurs.
IV Optimal Forgetting
In this section we derive conditions under which forgetting entrepreneurs’ failures is a socially
optimal policy. That is when, in the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1, q>0
dominates q = 0. The welfare criterion we use is again the total surplus.
What are the eﬀects of the forgetting policy on the equilibrium properties? When we are
in regions a. and c. of Proposition 1, q has no eﬀect on the surplus generated in equilibrium
by ﬁnancing to safe entrepreneurs. This follows because, within each region, the set of nodes
for which the safe agents are ﬁnanced does not depend on q: in region c. there is ﬁnancing
for all p>0, and in region a. there is ﬁnancing for p>p NF, where recall that pNF does not
depend on q. So in these cases the only eﬀect of q is on the surplus generated by ﬁnancing
to risky entrepreneurs.
In this regard, a ﬁrst implication of raising q is that the probability that a risky en-
trepreneur will be excluded from ﬁnancing decreases: failure of his project leads to exclusion
only with probability 1 − q. The impact of this on welfare depends on the eﬀort choice of
the risky entrepreneur after his failure is forgotten. If he exerts high eﬀort (as will be the
case in region c.), then this extra period of ﬁnancing makes a strictly positive contribution
19As discussed above, this could only occur in region c.
20to the social surplus, given by G ≡ πhR −1−c>0. Under low eﬀort, however (as in region
a.), the contribution is strictly negative: B ≡ πlR − 1 < 0.
But increasing q has another eﬀect that needs to be taken into account: since exclusion
after a project’s failure is less likely, the incentives to exert high eﬀort will be weaker. In
region a. (in which low eﬀort is always exerted when ﬁnancing takes place), the weakening
of incentives manifests itself in the fact that the lower bound of this region,
(R−1)(1−βq)
1−β(πl+(1−πl)q),
is decreasing in q, so that this region expands when q is increased. Analogously, the up-
per bound of parameter region c. (where high eﬀort is always exerted),
(R−1/πh)(1−βq)
1−β(πl+(1−πl)q), also
decreases in q, so that this region becomes smaller when q is higher.
Let q(p0) denote the welfare maximizing level of q (which clearly depends on the pro-
portion p0 of risky types in the population, as the equilibrium depends on it). From the
above discussion the properties of the optimal forgetting policy when the parameters of the
economy are in region a. or c. of Proposition 1 (with q = 0) immediately follow:
Proposition 3. The welfare maximizing forgetting policy respectively for high and low values









1−βπl , for any p0 > 0 some degree of forgetting is optimal: q(p0) > 0.
Thus in region c., when incentives are strong and high eﬀort is implemented everywhere,
some positive level of forgetting is optimal.
We now turn our attention to region b., the intermediate values of c, where the level of
eﬀort varies along the equilibrium path (switching at some point from low to high). The
weakening of incentives due to forgetting now manifests itself not only in the change of the
boundaries of this region, which again shift to the left as q increases, but also in the change
of the points in the equilibrium paths where the switch from low to high eﬀort takes place.
Such switching points are identiﬁed by the levels of ph(q),p m(q), and pl(q) introduced in
Proposition 1.20 In what follows we will restrict attention to prior probabilities p0 >p NF,i n
which case there is ﬁnancing in the initial period regardless of the level of q; this will allow
us to ignore any possible eﬀect of q on pl(q). These switching points are key to the analysis
of the welfare impact of raising q, since an extra period of ﬁnancing with high eﬀort makes
a positive contribution to the social surplus, while one with low eﬀort makes a negative
contribution.
20The dependence of these switching points on q is now highlighted.
21Notice ﬁrst that when p0 >p h(0) high eﬀort is always exerted by a risky entrepreneur
when ﬁnanced. Hence an analogous argument to that used to prove case 2. of Proposition 3
establishes that the socially optimal level of q is above 0 in this case.
On the other hand, when p0 ≤ ph(0) raising q above 0, while leading to a lower probability
of exclusion, does not necessarily increase welfare. There is a tradeoﬀ between the positive
eﬀect when high eﬀort is exerted (i.e., when p>p h(0)), and its negative eﬀect when low eﬀort
may be exerted (when p<p h(0)). There are in fact two facets to the negative eﬀect when
p<p h(0). First, as discussed above, an agent whose failure is forgotten has an opportunity
to exert low eﬀort once again. In addition, raising q will “slow down the updating”. That
is, pS(p) will be closer to p, and thus a longer string of successes will be required until the
risky entrepreneurs exert high eﬀort.
We will show in what follows that the positive eﬀect of raising q prevails over the negative
ones when (i) agents are suﬃciently patient (β close to 1), (ii) p0 is suﬃciently close to ph(0),
and (iii) |B| is suﬃciently small relative to G. The ﬁrst two conditions, in particular, are
needed because the positive eﬀect follows the negative ones along the equilibrium path. The
third condition more generally limits the degree to which low eﬀort reduces welfare.
In addition, we must also take into account that raising q may increase ph(q) as well,
since the fact that failures are less costly can weaken incentives.21 When β is close to 1,
however, we are able to show that ph(q) does not grow too much, because the positive eﬀect
of raising q on the continuation utility in case of success is larger, thereby mitigating the
negative eﬀect on incentives from the weaker punishment after failure we have with q>0.






1−βπl, the optimal policy
might also exhibit forgetting. More precisely:
1. If p0 >p h(0), welfare is always maximized at q(p0) > 0.





h), then for β suﬃ-
ciently close to 1 we also have q(p0) > 0.
While the condition in case 2. is stated in terms of ph(0), which is an endogenous variable,
it is possible to show that it is not vacuous22 (this is also evident from the examples in the
next section). Figure 6 illustrates the welfare-maximizing forgetting policy, as derived in
Propositions 3 and 4, as a function of the cost of eﬀort c.
21This, however, may not always be the case, since a higher value of q also increases the continuation
utility upon success.
22In particular, let πl → 1/R, so that B → 0. If we hold c and R ﬁxed, then it is not hard to show that
ph(0) will be bounded away from 0, so that the condition will be satisﬁed.
22Figure 6: Welfare-maximizing forgetting policy, as a function of c
While the previous results give conditions under which some q>0 maximizes total
welfare, we can also determine when q(p0) = 1, i.e., when it is optimal to keep no record
of any failure. Evidently, this is the case when ph(1) ≤ 1 and p0 ≥ ph(1). In the next
Proposition we show that these conditions are also necessary.
Proposition 5. q =1maximizes total welfare if and only if
c








Note that the restriction on c in this Proposition is always satisﬁed for c suﬃciently close to
its minimal value, as deﬁned by Assumption 2.
Remark 4. (Who Beneﬁts from Forgetting?) While the above results demonstrate that it is
possible to achieve an improvement in total welfare by forgetting past failures, it is useful
to distinguish the impact of forgetting across the two types of entrepreneurs. It is easy to
see that the risky entrepreneurs must gain whenever forgetting leads to an improvement in
total welfare, since the improvement arises precisely because, rather than being excluded
from ﬁnancing after failing, with some probability they are permitted to re-enter the pool
of agents who receive ﬁnancing. By contrast, forgetting generally hurts the safe types, since
it slows down the updating, and the lower is p, the higher the interest rate paid. The only
way in which forgetting might possibly beneﬁt the safe types is if it were to decrease the
high-eﬀort cutoﬀ ph(q), since the interest rate will be lower when the risky entrepreneurs
exert high eﬀort. We will see that this is not the case for the examples presented in section V
below; so in those cases forgetting, while maximizing total surplus, hurts the safe types.
Remark 5. (Risky Entrepreneurs Can Fail Even Under High Eﬀort) As we discussed above,
the social beneﬁt of forgetting failures arises from the additional periods of ﬁnancing under
23high eﬀort which it permits. In light of this, we can also understand the importance of our
assumption that the risky entrepreneur can fail even when he exerts high eﬀort, i.e., that
πh < 1. When this is not the case and we have πh = 1 (as, for example, in Diamond, 1989)
then high eﬀort ensures success, and there is no beneﬁt from forgetting a failure, since such
failures only result from low eﬀort.
Discussion — Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications
Our model captures many of the key arguments made in the Congressional debate surround-
ing the adoption of the FCRA, which we summarized in the Introduction. As such, it allows
us to determine conditions under which the positive arguments prevail over the negative
ones.
Notice ﬁrst that the main argument put forward in favor of forgetting — that it allows
individuals to obtain a true fresh start and hence to continue being productive members of
society — is echoed in our model, where the positive eﬀect on welfare of forgetting is that it
gives risky entrepreneurs who fail access to new ﬁnancing. They sometimes exert high eﬀort,
and hence this may increase aggregate surplus.23 Furthermore, all of the arguments made
against forgetting operate in our model: (i) forgetting weakens incentives by reducing the
penalty for failure — i.e., region c. shrinks, and region a. increases in size, as we raise q; (ii)
by erasing the records of those who were bad risks in the past, there is an increased risk that
they will commit fraud in the future — the analog in our model is that forgetting “slows
down” the weeding out of risky entrepreneurs; (iii) forgetting can lead to tighter lending
standards — in our model this may be seen most sharply in the fact that forgetting makes
region c. (where there is ﬁnancing for all p0 > 0 and interest rates are lower) smaller.24 In
addition, while the policy debate suggested that (iv) another negative eﬀect of forgetting is
that it forces safe agents to subsidize the risky, this is in fact socially optimal in our model,
because it thereby improves the risky entrepreneurs’ incentives.25
Our results are also consistent with the empirical evidence in Musto (2004). Forgetting
clearly leads to increased credit scores for those who fail, and thus to more credit — in our
23Two other arguments were also made in favor of forgetting — that old information may be less relevant,
and limited storage space — these do not have a role in our model. Furthermore, we conjecture that even if
old information were less relevant (as will be the case if the type of an entrepreneur could change), lenders
would take this into account and give it less weight in equilibrium.
24Just as suggested in the policy debate, the cohorts who are excluded from ﬁnancing as a result of the
introduction of such a policy are those with a low p0 — i.e. the bad risks (see also example 2. in the next
section).
25Since only they face a moral hazard problem.
24model they would have p = 0, and no credit, without forgetting. Moreover, Musto’s second
point — that those who have their failure forgotten are likelier to fail in the future than those
who are observationally equivalent (i.e. with the same score) is also an implication of the
model, since only the risky agents ever have their failure forgotten. However, in contrast to
Musto’s suggestion that these laws are ineﬃcient, Propositions 3 and 4 show that forgetting
may be optimal.
Our model can also help us understand the international evidence, and in particular the
relationship between forgetting clauses and the provision of credit. An implication of our
model is that, if the forgetting clause is optimally determined, then there will be a positive
relationship between credit volume and the degree of forgetting (as measured by q). The
ﬁrst reason is that forgetting is optimal when incentives are strong, i.e. for low values of
c. Also, in this case, the introduction of a forgetting policy further increases the volume of
credit, since it gives entrepreneurs who fail another chance at ﬁnancing. This relationship is
consistent with the empirical evidence reported in Figure 2 for those countries that have a
credit bureau in place. Those countries in which information is only reported for a limited
period of time have higher provision of credit than those in which the policy is to never
forget defaults.
But what about those countries with no credit bureau, i.e., in which there is no infor-
mation sharing? In our model this would only be optimal for very low values of c, in which
case credit would be plentiful. However, these countries actually have the lowest provision
of credit in the data. One way to understand this is that the ﬁnancial systems in these
countries are not fully developed, and that, as shown by several authors (see, for example,
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer 2007, and Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano 2007), the introduc-
tion of a credit bureau would be beneﬁcial in such cases. And indeed, from the historical
record shown in Figure 1, we can see that the fraction of countries with no credit bureau has
been shrinking over time, whereas the relative shares of the other two groups have remained
stable.
Finally, while we have shown that forgetting past defaults can be welfare improving,
this would never arise in equilibrium as the outcome of the choice of lenders. As shown
in Lemma 1, there cannot exist any Markov Perfect Equilibrium in which agents who are
known to be risky (as is the case for those who failed) obtain ﬁnancing. Thus forgetting
can only occur through government regulation of the credit bureau’s information disclosure
policies.
25V Examples
In this section we present a few examples to illustrate the results of the previous sections.
Let R =3 ,πh =0 .5, and πl =0 .32. With regard to the remaining parameters, c,β and p0,
we consider some alternative speciﬁcations, which allow us to obtain the diﬀerent types of
equilibria described in Proposition 1. Note that for assumptions 1 and 2 to be satisﬁed, the
eﬀort cost c must lie in the interval (0.18,0.5).
1. Let c =0 .4 and β =0 .975. For these values we are in region b. of Proposition 1, for
which high eﬀort is implemented when p ≥ ph(q). The threshold ph(0) above which
high eﬀort is exerted when q = 0 can be computed from equation (12) in the Appendix,
which yields: ph(0) = 0.241.
When p0 >p h(0) = 0.241, from Proposition 4 we know that q(p0) > 0 is optimal,
because forgetting failures increases the rounds of ﬁnancing to risky entrepreneurs
and in these new rounds they always exert high eﬀort. On the other hand, for
p0 ∈ [pNF,p h(0)) = [0.0196,0.241) low eﬀort is exerted with at least some positive
probability. However, for the parameters of this example B/G satisﬁes the condition
stated in 2. of Proposition 4 whenever p0 > 0.205. Thus some degree of forgetting
will be optimal for β suﬃciently close to 1; we will verify that this is indeed the case
when β =0 .975. The reason is that for these parameters the increase in surplus
G = πhR − 1 − c =0 .1 from a project undertaken with high eﬀort is high, relative to
the decrease in surplus B = −0.04 from a project undertaken with low eﬀort and so,
for agents who are suﬃciently patient the additional periods of high eﬀort provided by
forgetting outweigh the cost of the extra periods of low eﬀort at the start of the game.
Consider p0 =0 .206. When q =0 ,w eh a v epS(p0)=0 .448 >p h, and so low eﬀort
is exerted for the ﬁrst round of ﬁnancing along the equilibrium path, and high eﬀort
forever after, as long as the projects succeed.26 However, when q>0, more rounds of
ﬁnancing with low eﬀort may be needed before risky entrepreneurs begin to exert high
eﬀort, both because the updating is slower and because ph(q) is higher. For example,
with q =0 .735 three periods of ﬁnancing with low eﬀort followed by success of the
project are needed until the posterior exceeds ph(0.735) = 0.322. We now compare
welfare levels for diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the forgetting policy. In ﬁgure 7 we plot
the value of the total surplus W(q,0.206) as a function of q, when p0 =0 .206. From
26The risky entrepreneurs never randomize in their eﬀort choice along the equilibrium path for any of the
values of p0 and q considered in this example.
26Figure 7: Example 1: total welfare as a func-
tion of q (when p0 =0 .206)
Figure 8: Example 1: welfare-maximizing
value of q
this ﬁgure one can see that the optimum obtains at q(0.206) = 0.77, in which case
W(0.77,0.206) = 16.648.
We also plot in ﬁgure 8 the optimal level q(p0) of the forgetting policy27 as we vary the
prior probability p0.28
2. Consider next c =0 .26 and β =0 .975. We are now in region c. of Proposition 1,
for which high eﬀort is exerted for all p>0. As long as q ≤ 0.359 (i.e., as long
as q is suﬃciently low that we remain in region c.), forgetting provides additional
opportunities for projects to be undertaken with high eﬀort, and so is clearly eﬃcient.
Hence, as we can see in ﬁgure 9, we have W(0.359,p) > W(0,p) for all p>0.
As we raise q further, incentives become so weak that we move into region b.; it is then
no longer the case that the risky entrepreneurs exert high eﬀort for all p.29 We know
from Proposition 4, however, that as long as p0 >p h(q), raising q continues to improve
welfare, as the risky agents will exert high eﬀort when they are ﬁnanced again. For
example, with q =0 .975 this is the case for all p0 >p h(0.975) = 0.1139.
By contrast, for p0 ∈ (pNF,p h(q)] we face the same tradeoﬀ discussed in example 1
above. A higher q leads to more rounds of ﬁnancing where both low and high eﬀort
are exerted. When p0 is suﬃciently close to ph(q), the time spent in the low eﬀort
region will be relatively short, and thus increasing the level q of forgetting above
27We discretize the domains of p0 and q. For each point in the grid we compute ph(q) and then the welfare
W(q,p0). We assign q(p0) to be the value of q that maximizes this surplus, given p0.
28Although the condition in 2. of Proposition 4 is violated for p0 ≤ 0.205, we can nevertheless still have
q(p0) > 0 , since the condition is only suﬃcient, not necessary.
29For the values of c and β under consideration we are never in region a., no matter how high q.
270.359 may still increase surplus. As we see in ﬁgure 9, when p0 > 0.066 we have
W(0.975,p 0) > W(0.359,p 0). On the other hand, when p0 is closer to pNF =0 .0196 the
cost of additional rounds of ﬁnancing with low eﬀort dominates, in which case welfare
is higher for q =0 .359.
Finally, for very low values of p0 (in particular p0 <p NF) there will be no ﬁnancing when
q is suﬃciently high. The reason is that there is no feasible interest rate which would
allow lenders to break even for these values of p0; the lenders make losses on the risky
entrepreneurs because they exert low eﬀort, and there are too few safe entrepreneurs
from which to recoup these losses. In other words, raising q too much can lead to
a tightening in lending standards, as discussed in the previous section. For example,
when p0 <p NF there is no ﬁnancing if q =0 .975; hence the optimal value of q is clearly
lower.
Figure 9: Example 2: total welfare
3. Finally, consider β =0 .8, c =0 .48 and a slightly lower value for πl: πl =0 .3. While
these parameters are in region b., as in example 1 above, the contribution G to total
surplus of a project undertaken with high eﬀort is now much lower and agents are less
patient. As a consequence, the condition stated in 2. of Proposition 4 never holds. In
this case we ﬁnd that welfare is decreasing in q for p0 suﬃciently low, as the cost of
less frequent exclusion in the low eﬀort region dominates the beneﬁt in the high eﬀort
28region. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 10 for the case p0 =0 .2.
Figure 10: Example 3: total welfare
VI Extension — Both Types can Fail
We extend the model to allow the projects of both the risky and safe types to fail, and we
present an example in which our central ﬁnding — that forgetting defaults may be welfare-
enhancing — continues to hold. We conjecture that the main qualitative features of our
previous results remain valid in this case, although a formal analysis of it is beyond the
scope of the current paper.
When both types can fail an agent who defaults can no longer be identiﬁed for certain
as risky. As discussed in Remark 1 above, he may thus be able to obtain additional periods
of ﬁnancing even without forgetting. As a result, one might think that forgetting would be
superﬂuous. In this example, however, forgetting continues to provide a beneﬁt even though
agents may obtain some ﬁnancing after they fail.
Let π ∈ (πh,1] denote the probability that the project of a safe entrepreneur fails. Con-
sider the following parameter values: R =3 ,π h =0 .5,πl =0 .32,β =0 .975,c=0 .35. When
π = 1 (the projects of safe types always succeed) these parameters fall in region b. of Propo-
sition 1, where (for q = 0) high eﬀort is exerted for all p ≥ ph(0) = 0.113, and agents are
ﬁnanced for all p ≥ pNF =0 .0196. The situation is thus analogous to Example 1 in the
29previous section. Consider the prior belief p0 =0 .1; by similar computations to that in the
example we derive the optimal forgetting policy: q(0.1 )=0 .77.
Next, suppose projects of safe entrepreneurs only succeed with probability π =0 .99.
We ﬁnd that the equilibrium strategies exhibit, in most respects, analogous properties to
those found in Proposition 1 (i.e. when π = 1).30 When q = 0 there is an MPE where
high eﬀort is exerted as long as p ≥ ph(0) = 0.1065, and entrepreneurs are ﬁnanced for
p ≥ pl = pNF =0 .0199.31 So long as p<0.58, we have pF(p) <p l and so a single failure still
results in exclusion; however, for higher values of p an agent will be able to obtain ﬁnancing
following a failure. Comparing theis value of πh(0) with the one found above for the case
π = 1, we see that the region of p for which high eﬀort is exerted is larger. The failure of a
project does not necessarily lead to exclusion, and this has two eﬀects on incentives. First,
when p is high a failure is not punished by exclusion, which weakens incentives. In addition,
however, the fact that the agent may be ﬁnanced following a failure in the future raises his
continuation utility upon success, which has a positive eﬀect on incentives. Such efect is
present no matter what is the current level of p. Thus for a relatively low value of p, this
second, positive, eﬀect clearly prevails.
Proceeding along the same lines, we also ﬁnd a MPE for positive values of q, and compute
the surplus function W(q,p0). In ﬁgure 11 we have plotted the improvement in total surplus
(relative to its level when q = 0) for various values of q: we see that when p0 =0 .1 total
surplus is maximal when q =0 .80.
An interesting feature of this extension is that forgetting may now also increase the
surplus generated by the projects of safe entrepreneurs who are ﬁnanced. Recall that, when
π = 1 this surplus was either unaﬀected, or decreased, by the introduction of forgetting.
Now, however, since safe entrepreneurs are also at risk of failing and hence of being excluded,
forgetting may beneﬁt them by increasing the likelihood that their projects will be ﬁnanced
in the future.
30To construct a Markov Perfect Equilibrium we must however follow a diﬀerent procedure, because the
continuation utility for an agent who fails no longer need be equal to zero. Hence we discretize the domain
of p and, for each pair of candidates values for pl ≥ pNF and ph < 1, we compute the value function for
the risky entrepreneurs, using value function iteration. We then determine whether these values are indeed
associated with an equilibrium by verifying that no deviation is proﬁtable, neither by borrowers nor lenders.
Finally, we select the pair with the lowest value of ph.
31In this example high eﬀort is implemented for all p ≥ ph, and so the equilibrium is qualitatively similar
to that of the main model of the paper. For higher values of c, however, high eﬀort could no longer be
sustained for p very close to 1; see Mailath and Samuelson (2001) for further discussion.
30Figure 11: Change in surplus with forgetting when both types can fail
VII Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the eﬀects of restrictions on the information available
to lenders on borrowers’ past performance. These restrictions may facilitate a “fresh start”
for borrowers in distress, but also clearly have an eﬀect on their incentives. To this end,
we have considered an environment where borrowers need to seek funds repeatedly, and
the borrower-lender relationship is characterized by the presence of both moral hazard and
adverse selection. In such a framework we have determined the eﬀects of such restrictions
on borrowers’ incentives as well as on lenders’ behavior, and hence on access to credit and
overall welfare. We found that imposing limits on the information available to lenders is
desirable when (i) borrowers’ incentives are suﬃciently strong, (ii) the average risk type is
not too low, (iii) low eﬀort is not too ineﬃcient, and (iv) agents are suﬃciently patient. In
this case imposing such limits is welfare improving and increases credit volume, otherwise
the reverse may obtain. We also show that these ﬁndings may help to explain the empirical
evidence.
As noted in the Introduction, there are some cross-country diﬀerences in the laws gov-
erning the memory of the credit reporting system; in general, European countries tend to
allow defaults to be forgotten more quickly. In addition, bankruptcy laws, which govern
the extent to which defaulting borrowers can shield assets and income, can also diﬀer dra-
31matically across countries. It would be interesting to study how these features of credit
markets interact, and how they are related to diﬀerences in the economic environments in
such countries.
VIII Appendix A — Proofs
Lemma 1 — No ﬁnancing when known to be risky
If p = 0, we must have pS(p,C0)=0=pF(p,C0) whatever C0, i.e., the agent will be known to
be risky in the future as well.
Furthermore, under assumption 1, if the agent is known to be the risky type, he can only
be ﬁnanced in a given period if he exerts high eﬀort with some probability, as otherwise
lenders cannot break even. But for high eﬀort (or mixing) to be incentive compatible, the
utility from high eﬀort must be no less than that from low eﬀort, i.e., the interest rate r
oﬀered must be such that:
πh(R − r) − c +( πh +( 1− πh)q)βv
r(p
S(0)) + (1 − πh)(1 − q)βv
r(p
F(0)) ≥
πl(R − r)+( πl +( 1− πl)q)βv
r(p
S(0)) + (1 − πl)(1 − q)βv
r(p
F(0)),
which simpliﬁes to the static incentive compatibility condition:
c
πh − πl
≤ R − r, (8)
since when p = 0 we have pS = pF =0 .
By assumption 2, this can only be satisﬁed if r<1/πh, in which case lenders cannot
break even. Thus the agent cannot be ﬁnanced in equilibrium if he is known to be risky.
Finally, since this agent is never ﬁnanced, it is immediate that vr(0) = 0.￿
Lemma 2 — All MPE are pooling
Suppose this is not the case; consider a candidate separating equilibrium. Let rs denote the
contracts chosen by the safe types and rr those chosen by the risky in such an equilibrium.
From Lemma 1 we know that in a separating MPE the risky types cannot be ﬁnanced, i.e.
we must have rr = ∅ for all nodes along the equilibrium path, and so their utility is vr =0 .
Hence for the risky entrepreneurs not to pretend to be safe, we must have either rs = R in
32every period, or rs = ∅ in every period (the contract must be the same in every period by
the Markov property). But if rs = ∅ the equilibrium would in fact be pooling, contrary to
the stated claim. We now argue that rs = R cannot be an equilibrium strategy for lenders,
because each lender would have an incentive to undercut and oﬀer R − ￿.
Consider, in particular, some future period t>0. In such period a lender can deviate
and oﬀer R − ￿ (for ￿ small) to the safe entrepreneurs. Note that this oﬀer can be made to
the safe agents alone because the credit history of a safe agent diﬀers from that of a risky
one by virtue of the fact that only the safe agents are ﬁnanced in the initial period in the
proposed equilibrium. Such a deviation would clearly be proﬁtable, thus overturning the
proposed equilibrium. ￿
Proposition 1 — Characterization of the Equilibrium
To complete the proof of Proposition 1, we establish the remaining properties of the MPE,
i. and iii., and the speciﬁc features of this equilibrium for parameter regions a., b., and c.
We begin by verifying property i. First note that the second part of property i. follows
immediately from Observation 2. It is also easy to verify the third part of property i.: that
a consistent belief for lenders is that an entrepreneur is risky if he refuses ﬁnancing. To see
this, simply let the risky entrepreneurs refuse ﬁnancing at some node with probability ￿>0,
and the safe ones with probability ￿2, and let ￿ → 0. Consistency of the above belief can
then readily be veriﬁed using Bayes’ Rule. This immediately demonstrates the ﬁrst part
of property i. as well, since from Lemma 1 refusing ﬁnancing would give an entrepreneur a
utility of 0.
We now verify the characterization of the equilibrium strategies provided for each region,
and show that there are no proﬁtable deviations by lenders.




1−β(πl+(1−πl)q), we need to demonstrate that (a-i) low eﬀort is incentive com-
patible for p ≥ pNF; (a-ii) r(p)=rzp(p,0) ≤ R for p ≥ pNF, i.e., it is admissible; and
(a-iii) there are no proﬁtable deviations by lenders.
a-i. Given the above strategies and beliefs, from (1) we get:
v
r(p)=πl(R − rzp(p,0)) + (πl +( 1− πl)q)βv
r(p
S(p)), (9)
since from Lemma 1vr(pF(p)) = vr(0) = 0.




≥ R − rzp(p,0) + β(1 − q)v
r(p
S(p)), (10)




1 − β(πl +( 1− πl)q)
,
where the term on the right-hand side is the present discounted utility of a risky
entrepreneur who is ﬁnanced in every period (until he has a failure that is not
forgotten), exerting low eﬀort, and at the rate r =1 .
So for any p ∈ (pNF,1), we have







where the last inequality follows from deﬁnition of region a. This veriﬁes (10).
a-ii. Note that rzp(p,0) ≤ R if and only if
1
p+(1−p)πl ≤ R, or equivalently p ≥ pNF.
a-iii. Consider a deviation by a lender. First note that lenders make zero proﬁts in
equilibrium, so refusing to oﬀer a contract would never be proﬁtable. So consider
a deviation consisting of the oﬀer of a contract r0 to entrepreneurs with credit
score p. Without loss of generality we can restrict attention to r0 > 1, since
otherwise the deviation could never be proﬁtable. Let the new set of contracts
(which includes the deviation r0)b eC0. But then by the same argument as in a-i.
above we can show that since r0 > 1, the optimal response by risky entrepreneurs
who accept r0 is to exert low eﬀort, i.e., er(p,C0) = 0. This implies that lenders
cannot proﬁt from r0. To see this, ﬁrst note that if r0 ≤ rzp(p,0) this deviation
could not be proﬁtable, since low eﬀort is exerted. Alternatively, suppose that
r0 >r zp(p,0). If p ≥ pNF, then this would imply that r0 >r (p) and so no borrower
would accept this contract. If p<p NF, however, then we must have r0 >Rby the
deﬁnition of pNF, and this deviation would not be admissible.







an MPE exists characterized by 0 <p l ≤ pm ≤ ph < 1 such that: for p ≥ pl en-
34trepreneurs are always ﬁnanced, er(p) = 1 for p ≥ ph, er(p) ∈ (0,1) and is (strictly)
increasing in p for p ∈ [pm,p h), er(p)=0f o rp ∈ [pl,p m) and r(p)=rzp(p,er(p)).
We begin by characterizing the values of (b-i) ph, (b-ii) pm and (b-iii) pl, showing that
the eﬀort choices speciﬁed above for the risky entrepreneurs are optimal. In (b-iv) we
demonstrate that there are no proﬁtable deviations for lenders.
b-i. Let ˜ pS(p,e) ≡
p
p+(1−p)[e(πh+(1−πh)q)+(1−e)(πl+(1−πl)q)]; this is the posterior belief, fol-
lowing a success, that an entrepreneur is risky, when the prior belief is p ∈ (0,1)
and the eﬀort undertaken if risky is e, calculated via Bayes’ Rule. Also, let ˜ vr(p,1)
denote the discounted expected utility for a risky entrepreneur with credit score
p when he is ﬁnanced in every period until experiencing a failure that is not for-
gotten, he exerts high eﬀort (e = 1), beliefs are updated according to ˜ pS(p,1) and
the interest rate is rzp(p0,1) for all p0 ≥ p. Then ˜ vr(p,1) satisﬁes the following
equation:32
˜ v
r(p,1) = πh(R − rzp(p,1)) − c + β(πh +( 1− πh)q)˜ v
r(˜ p
S(p,1),1). (11)
We then deﬁne ph as the value of p that satisﬁes the following equality:
c
πh − πl
= R − rzp(ph,1) + β(1 − q)˜ v
r(˜ p
S(ph,1),1) (12)
Observe that, since ˜ pS(p,1) is strictly increasing in p, and rzp(p,1) is strictly
decreasing, ˜ vr(p,1) is strictly increasing in p. Thus the term on the right-hand
side of (12) is increasing in p, and so (12) has at most one solution.
By a continuity argument, it can be veriﬁed that:
Claim 1. A solution ph ∈ (0,1) to (12) always exists.33
Given the monotonicity of the term on the right-hand side of (12), it is then
immediate that the incentivecompatibilityconstraint for high eﬀort (8) is satisﬁed
for all p ≥ ph .
b-ii. Next, we ﬁnd pm, the lower bound of the region where risky entrepreneurs mix
over high and low eﬀort, and establish the properties of the equilibrium in this
mixing region.
32Note that while ˜ vr(p,1) and ˜ pS(p,e) are well deﬁned for all p ∈ (0,1), they only coincide with the
equilibrium values vr(p) and pS(p) when both p ≥ ph and e = er(p)=1 .
33The proofs ofclaims 1-5can be found inappendix B (http://www.elul.org/papers/forget/appendix b.pdf).
35For mixing to be an equilibrium strategy at p, risky entrepreneurs must be indif-
ferent between high and low eﬀort, i.e.,






for some e ∈ [0,1]. Now, let
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1) denote the preimage of ph according to




= ph.34 We deﬁne pm to be the lowest
value of p ≥
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1) for which a solution of (13) can be found for some e.
Observe that by the construction of ph, e = 1 is a solution to (13) when p = ph,
and so pm ≤ ph. It can be shown that:
Claim 2. A lowest value pm always exists and, moreover, pm >
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1).
This implies that there is at most a single period of mixing along the equilibrium
path. It can also be shown that:
Claim 3. For all p ∈ [pm,p h], there exists a solution er(p) to (13), with er(p)
strictly increasing in p.
If there is more than one solution to (13) at p, we choose the highest.
b-iii. We still have to determine pl, the lower bound on the ﬁnancing region, and demon-
strate that low eﬀort is incentive compatible in [pl,p m).
￿ If pm ≥ pNF, set pl = pNF. By construction, rzp(p,0) ≤ R for all p ≥ pNF; hence
the contract rzp(p,er(p)) is admissible for all p ≥ pNF.
Alternatively, if pm <p NF set pl to be the lowest value of p ≥ pm such that the
contract rzp(p,er(p)) is admissible (i.e., not greater than R). Note that since
rzp(p,e) is decreasing in e, we have rzp(p,er(p)) ≤ rzp(p,0) for all p ∈ [pm,p NF], so
this will imply that pl ≤ pNF. In this case we also redeﬁne pm, with some abuse of
notation, to be equal to pl; following this redeﬁnition the low eﬀort region [pl,p m)
is then empty in this case.
Observe that in either case we have pl > 0. Furthermore, pl ≤ pNF, which implies
that rzp(p,0) >Rfor p<p l. Finally, pl ≤ pm, with pm as deﬁned in the preceding
paragraphs.
￿ To prove that er(p)=0f o rp ∈ [pl,p m) it suﬃces to consider the case pl = pNF
34That is, when the prior belief is
￿
˜ pS￿−1
(ph,1), and the entrepreneur exerts high eﬀort if risky, the
posterior belief of lenders after observing a success is equal to ph.
36(since when pl <p NF, we showed above that pl = pm, in which case there is no
low-eﬀort region).






. Intuitively, were low eﬀort not
incentive compatible in this region, that would contradict the construction of
pm as minimal. This is veriﬁed in the following:










˜ pS￿−1(ph,1)] = pl we are done. Otherwise, we need to iterate the











show that since r(p) >r (ph), low eﬀort must be incentive compatible for p in
this region.
We begin by showing that vr(pS(p)) <v r(pS(ph)). To see this, observe ﬁrst that
for all such values of p,w eh a v epS(p)=˜ pS(p,0) ≥ ph. Also, by Assumption 3,
we have pS(p) <p S(ph). Thus vr(pS(p)) <v r(pS(ph)), since vr(p0) was shown
to be strictly increasing for p0 ≥ ph (as vr(p0)=˜ vr(p,1) in this region).
This then implies that low eﬀort is incentive compatible. To see this, ﬁrst note
that, by the deﬁnition of ph,w eh a v eR − r(ph)+β(1 − q)vr(pS(ph)) = c
πh−πl.
But we have shown above that vr(pS(p)) <v r(pS(ph)). Also, r(p) ≡ rzp(p,0) >
rzp(ph,1) ≡ r(ph). Thus,






and so low eﬀort is incentive compatible at p.
• If max[pl,
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,0)] = pl we are done. Otherwise we proceed as follows. It
is convenient here to use the shorthand ˜ pS−1









. To prove that low eﬀort is incen-
tive compatible at p, the following bounds on the risky agent’s utility function
— obtained in each case by substituting the relevant incentive compatibility
constraint into the recursive deﬁnition of the risky entrepreneur’s utility, given
by (1) — will be useful:36






(ph,1). This property can be easily
veriﬁed from the expression of ˜ pS(p,e) and can be understood as follows: for any given p, the lower the prob-
ability e that the risky entrepreneurs exert high eﬀort, the stronger is success a signal that the entrepreneur
is a safe type.
36When er(p) = 1 (1) reduces to vr(p)=πh(R − r(p)) − c + β(πh +( 1− πh)q)vr(pS(p)), and hence we
37vr(p) ≥





, if er(p) = 1; (14)
vr(p) ≤





, if er(p) = 0; (15)
vr(p)=





, if (13) holds (mixing). (16)
For p lying in the interval under consideration, we have pS(p) <p h. Also, with
low eﬀort pS(p) ≥ ˜ pS−1
. Now recall that we have shown immediately above
that er(p0) < 1 for all p0 ∈ [˜ pS−1
,p h); and, in particular, er(pS(p)) < 1. So
(15) and (16) imply that vr(pS(p)) ≤
c(πl+q/(1−q))
πh−πl − (R − r(pS(p))
q
1−q. On the
other hand, since the equilibrium implements high eﬀort at ph, by (14) we have
vr(ph) ≥
c(πl+q/(1−q))
πh−πl − (R − r(ph))
q
1−q. Moreover, since we have shown that
v(p0) is increasing for p0 ≥ ph, and pS(ph) ≥ ph, this also implies vr(pS(ph)) ≥
c(πl+q/(1−q))
πh−πl − (R − r(ph))
q
1−q.


















< −r(ph). Hence (17) implies that
R − r(p)+β(1 − q)v
r(p






where the ﬁnal equality follows from the deﬁnition of ph. We conclude that low




,0)] = pl we are done. Otherwise, we proceed by induc-




,0)]. Observe that we have





. So we can
get β(1 − q)vr(pS(p)) =
(v
r(p)+c−πh(R−r(p)))(1−q)
πh+(1−πh)q . The high-eﬀort IC constraint (8) can then be rewrit-
ten as follows: β(1 − q)vr(pS(p)) ≥ c




πh−πl − (R − r(p)), or (vr(p)+c − πh(R − r(p)))(1 − q) ≥
￿
c
πh−πl − (R − r(p))
￿
(πh +( 1− πh)q). Simplifying, we get (14). The other expressions are similarly ob-
tained.
38iterate the same argument as above, and do so until reaching pl.
b-iv. As noted in a-iii. above, we can restrict attention to lenders’ deviations consisting
in the oﬀer of a contract r0 > 1 to entrepreneurs with credit score p.
Now, for r0 to be accepted it must be lower than the equilibrium rate when there
is ﬁnancing in equilibrium. So when p ≥ pl, it suﬃces to consider r0 <r (p) ≡
rzp(p,er(p)). When p<p l there is no ﬁnancing in equilibrium, and the deviation
can be any contract r0 ∈ (1,R].
In the statement of the Proposition we did not describe the risky entrepreneurs’
eﬀort strategy er(p,C0) oﬀ the equilibrium path. We will do so here, and show
that er(p,C0) renders any possible deviation r0 described in the previous paragraph
unproﬁtable.
￿ We ﬁrst begin with the simplest case: p ≥ ph. Since high eﬀort is implemented
for these values of p, it is immediate that no deviation could be proﬁtable, since
for r0 to be accepted by the entrepreneurs we would need r0 <r (p)=rzp(p,1).













then er(p,r0) = 0 is an optimal eﬀort choice for entrepreneurs when they are
oﬀered the rate r0 and lenders’ belief is that they exert low eﬀort. If in addition
p ≥ pl we need r0 <r (p) ≤ rzp(p,0) for r0 to attract some entrepreneurs, and so
the deviation will be unproﬁtable. On the other hand, if p<p l, from b-iii. above
we know that rzp(p,0) >R(since pl ≤ pNF), while the admissibility of the contract
requires r0 ≤ R, implying r0 <r zp(p,0). That is, the deviation is unproﬁtable in
this case as well.
Alternatively, suppose the reverse inequality to (18) holds. This means that low
eﬀort is not an optimal response to r0. Nevertheless, the deviation can be shown
to be unproﬁtable. More precisely, we show in what follows that, were a proﬁtable
deviation to exist, this would contradict the construction of the equilibrium (in
particular, either the deﬁnition of ph,o ro fpm,o rer(p) being maximal in the
mixing region).
We begin by determining the eﬀort level and lenders’ beliefs associated with r0.
First note that, for the values of p under consideration, ˜ pS(p,e) ≥ ph for all e.
Then since ˜ pS(p,e) is decreasing with respect to e (footnote 35) and vr(p0) is both
39increasing and continuous for p0 ≥ ph, we either have
R − r







0 = 1 (19)
or
R − r







0 ∈ (0,1), (20)
so that the optimal eﬀort choice of risky entrepreneurs when C0 contains r0 and r0
is chosen, is er(p,C0)=e0, and lenders’ beliefs ˜ pS(p,e0) are consistent with Bayes’
Rule.
We will establish that r0 ≤ rzp(p,e0), implying that the deviation to r0 is unprof-
itable. Suppose that this is not the case, i.e. that r0 >r zp(p,e0); we will prove in
what follows that this implies a contradiction.
When e0 =1 ,r0 >r zp(p,e0)=rzp(p,1) together with (19) imply R − rzp(p,1) +
β(1 − q)vr(˜ pS(p,1)) ≥
c
πh−πl. But since, as we argued, vr(p0) is increasing for
p ≥ ph and rzp(·,1) strictly decreasing, this would imply that R − rzp(ph,1) +
β(1 − q)vr(˜ pS(ph,1)) > c
πh−πl, contradicting the construction of ph in (12).













, so that vr(˜ pS(p,e)) = ˜ vr(˜ pS(p,e),1) for any e,
and, from the deﬁnition of ph,






By the continuity of ˜ vr(p,1) it follows that there must be a solution ˜ e ∈ (e0,1)
to (13) for the value of p under consideration. If p<p m the existence of such a
solution contradicts the construction of pm as the minimalvalue of p for which a so-
lution e to (13) exists, with rzp(p,er(p)) ≤ R, in the region p ∈ [
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1),p h],
since rzp(p, ˜ e) <r zp(p,e0) <r 0 <r (p). Alternatively, consider p ≥ pm.I f˜ e>e r(p)
this contradicts the construction of er(p) as the highest solution of (13) at p (see
the proof of Claim 3). On the other hand, if ˜ e ≤ er(p), this implies e0 <e r(p),
and thus r0 >r zp(p,e0) >r zp(p,er(p)) = r(p), another contradiction.
￿ Now consider the remaining values: p ∈ (0,
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1)). We restrict atten-
40tion to deviations r0 >r zp(p,1); this is without loss of generality, since if this
were not the case the deviation could never be proﬁtable, regardless of the risky
entrepreneurs’ eﬀort choice (since no entrepreneur refuses ﬁnancing). But recall
that, in the proof of b-iii., we showed that for p<
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1), low eﬀort will
be chosen at r0 whenever r0 >r (ph)=rzp(ph,1). This implies then, just as
in the argument immediately following (18) above, that the deviation must be
unproﬁtable.




1−β(πl+(1−πl)q). Note ﬁrst that, by
Assumption 1, rzp(p,1) ≤ R for all p>0, so r(p)=rzp(p,1) is always admissible.
Also, the argument that there are no proﬁtable deviations for lenders is the same as
the one in b-iv., for the case p ≥ ph. So it only remains to verifythat risky entrepreneurs
indeed prefer to exert high rather than low eﬀort for all p>0.
For high eﬀort to be incentive compatible for all p>0, we need to show that
c
πh − πl
≤ R − r(p)+β(1 − q)v
r(p
S(p)). (21)
Notice that, for any p>0, a lower bound for vr(p) is given by
πh(R−1/πh)−c
1−β(πh+q(1−πh)), which is
the present discounted utility for a risky entrepreneur who is ﬁnanced in every period
(until a failure that is not forgotten) at r =1 /πh and exerts high eﬀort.37
Thus since pS(p) > 0 for all p>0, we have
R − r(p)+β(1 − q)v
r(p
S(p)) >R− 1/πh + β(1 − q)
πh(R − 1/πh) − c
1 − β(πh +( 1− πh)q)
.
So to verify (21) it suﬃces to show that
R − 1/πh + β(1 − q)
πh(R − 1/πh) − c





But this follows immediately from the deﬁnition of region c.38￿
37This follows immediately from the fact that vr(p) is the present discounted utility under the same
circumstances except that the interest rate is r(p)=rzp(p,1) < 1/πh for all p>0.
38Suppose this were not the case, so that R − 1/πh + β(1 − q)
πh(R−1/πh)−c
1−β(πh+(1−πh)q) < c
πh−πl. If we multiply
both sides of this inequality by (πh − πl)(1 − β(πh +( 1− πh)q)) and then simplify, this becomes c
πh−πl >
(R−1/πh)(1−βq)
1−β(πl+(1πl)q) , contradicting the lower bound on c that deﬁnes region c.
41Proposition 2 — Eﬃciency of Equilibrium
We begin by showing that the equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 maximizes er(p), the
eﬀort exerted by the risky entrepreneurs, for any p; this will play an important role in the
proof of the Proposition. This result is intuitive, as the equilibrium of Proposition 1 was
constructed recursively, with eﬀort chosen to be maximal at each stage.
Claim 5. The equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 maximizes the risky entrepreneurs’
eﬀort er(p), across all symmetric sequential MPE, when q ∈{ 0,1}. When q ∈ (0,1) this
result holds as long as πl ≥ πh
q
1+q.
The following corollary is immediate, since for lenders to break even when p<p l a higher
level of eﬀort is needed than in the equilibrium of Proposition 1, contradicting Claim 5.
Corollary 1. No MPE can implement ﬁnancing when p<p l.
We now turn to demonstrating that the equilibrium of Proposition 1 is the most eﬃcient
MPE. The result follows from the above claim, since surplus in any given period will also be
higher, given properties (i)-(iii) of the equilibrium of Proposition 1.
From Corollary 1, we can restrict attention to p0 ≥ pl, without loss of generality. Recall
that welfare is given by the total surplus accruing from the agents’ projects that are ﬁnanced.
Let W(p) denote the total surplus at the MPE of Proposition 1 accruing from projects of
entrepreneurs with credit score p, and let W(p) denote the total surplus at a diﬀerent MPE.
We will show that we always have W(p) ≥ W(p) for p ≥ pl.
Observe that when p = p0 there is a measure p0 of safe entrepreneurs, and 1 − p0 of
risky entrepreneurs, while when their credit score is p>p 0 there is a measure p0 of safe
entrepreneurs, and a measure
p0
p − p0 of risky entrepreneurs, since the safe types never fail.
So total surplus can be deﬁned recursively:












where πe(p) ≡ πher(p)+πl(1−er(p)) is the risky entrepreneurs’ success probability given the
equilibrium eﬀort level at p, and similarly for W(p).39
Observe that W(p) is strictly decreasing for p ≥ ph.40 It is then immediate to verify that
W(p) ≥ W(p) for all p ≥ ph. Now consider p ∈ [pm,p h). If ¯ r(p)=∅ (i.e., there is no ﬁnancing
39Analogously, deﬁne π¯ e(p) ≡ πh¯ er(p)+πl(1 − ¯ er(p)).
40Since er(p) = 1 for all p ≥ ph, and
p0
p − p0 (the measure of risky entrepreneurs who have not been
excluded thus far) is decreasing in p.
42at p in the other MPE under consideration), then W(p) = 0, and so clearly W(p) ≥ W(p).
Alternatively, suppose that ¯ r(p) 6= ∅. Then we know from Claim 5 that er(p) ≥ ¯ er(p), which
also implies that ¯ pS(p) ≥ pS(p) ≥ ph, and thus that W(¯ pS(p)) ≥ W(¯ pS(p)). So
























If we replace W(¯ pS(p)) with W(pS(p)) in the righthand side of the inequality this cannot
decrease its value, since we showed that W(p0) is decreasing for p0 ≥ ph (and ¯ pS(p) ≥ pS(p)),
thus demonstrating that W(p) ≤W (p) for p ∈ [pm,p h).
We use induction to establish the result for the remaining values of p: p ∈ [pl,p m).
Let p∗ = pm and p∗∗ ≡
￿
˜ pS￿−1(p∗,1). Recall that we have shown in Claim 5 that either
(i) ¯ r(p)=∅, and hence W
r
(p) = 0; or else (ii) ¯ er(p)=er(p) = 0, in which case it is
immediate that W(p)=W(p)+β[W(pS(p)) −W(pS(p))]. Since we have established above
that W(p0) ≥ W(p0) for p0 ≥ p∗, it thus follows that W(p) ≥ W(p). If p∗∗ >p l, redeﬁne
p∗ ≡ p∗∗, and p∗∗ ≡
￿
˜ pS￿−1
(p∗,1), and repeat the same argument as above. ￿
Proposition 3 – Optimal Forgetting (regions a. and c.)






1−β(πl+(1−πl)q) is decreasing in q, the condition
deﬁning region a. in Proposition 1 is satisﬁed for all q. At the MPE there is ﬁnancing only
when p0 ≥ pNF and risky entrepreneurs never exert high eﬀort, regardless of the value of q.
Hence if p0 ≥ pNF, the total surplus generated in equilibrium by the loans to risky
entrepreneurs is
B
1−(πl+(1−πl)q)β, , which is strictly decreasing in q since B<0. Thus q =0
is optimal. If on the other hand p0<pNF, such surplus is zero for all q, and so q = 0 is also
(weakly) optimal.
Consider now case 2. Again notice that
(R−1/πh)(1−βq)














￿ > 0. Hence at the MPE there is always ﬁnancing whatever
p0 is, and for all q ∈ [0,q∗], and risky entrepreneurs always exert high eﬀort. That is, for
q ∈ [0,q∗], the total surplus generated in equilibrium by the loans to risky entrepreneurs is
G
1 − (πh +( 1− πh)q)β
.
43Now this is increasing in q since G>0. Thus any q ∈ (0,q∗] dominates q = 0 and the
optimal value will be q(p0) ≥ q∗.41￿
Proposition 4 – Optimal Forgetting (region b.)
For case 1 (p0 >p h(0)) the proof is an immediate corollary of the second case of Proposition 3.
Consider then case 2. Since p0 ≥ pNF, the agents will always be ﬁnanced at the initial
date, irrespective of q. Thus, by the argument given above, it suﬃces to show that we
can increase the surplus generated by the risky entrepreneurs’ projects. Letting Wr(q,p0)
denote the surplus from the risky agents’ projects, when the forgetting policy is q and the
prior probability of being safe is p0, we will show that under the conditions stated in the
Proposition, we can ﬁnd some ¯ q>0 such that Wr(¯ q,p 0) > Wr(0,p 0).
We proceed as follows. For any q>0 we ﬁrst ﬁnd a threshold ˜ ph(q) for ph(q), relative
to ph(0), such that if ph(q) < ˜ ph(q) then the surplus from risky entrepreneurs’ projects is
higher at q than at 0. We then show that the parameter restrictions stated in the Proposition
ensure the existence of ¯ q>0 such that ph(¯ q) ≤ ˜ ph(q).
Let n(q,p0) denote the number of successes (or forgotten failures), starting from the
prior p0, until the risky entrepreneurs ﬁrst exert high eﬀort, when the forgetting policy is
q. Then the following upper and lower bounds for the surplus generated by lending to risky











B(1 − ((πl +( 1− πl)q)β)n(q,p0))
1 − (πl +( 1− πl)q)β
+
G(πl +( 1− πl)q)β)n(q,p0)
1 − (πh +( 1− πh)q)β
. (23)
41The optimal value of q could be higher than q∗, which would push us out of region c., into region b.
42When there is no mixing in equilibrium (i.e. pm(q)=ph(q)), Wr is simply equal to the discounted
expect surplus generated by consecutive successes of the project (the ﬁrst n(q,p0) of which with low eﬀort,
the remainder with high eﬀort):
Wr(q,p0)=
B(1 − ((πl +( 1− πl)q)β)n(q,p0))
1 − (πl +( 1− πl)q)β
+
G(πl +( 1− πl)q)β)n(q,p0)
1 − (πh +( 1− πh)q)β
.
With mixing in equilibrium, the exact expression of Wr depends on the equilibrium level of eﬀort exerted
in the mixing region. However, since there can be at most only a single period of mixing in equilibrium, an
upper and lower bound for such utility is given by (22) and (23), independent of the mixing probability.







B(1 − ((πl +( 1− πl)q)β)n(q,p0))
1 − (πl +( 1− πl)q)β
+
G(πl +( 1− πl)q)β)n(q,p0)
1 − (πh +( 1− πh)q)β
.








(1 − πl)(1 − πh)
￿








(1 − πl)(1 − q)
+
(πl +( 1− πl)q)n(q,p0)
(1 − q)(1 − πl)(1 − πh)
￿










l (1 − q) −
B
G(1 − πh)q
(1 − πl) − B
G(1 − πh)
< (πl +( 1− πl)q)
n(q,p0) (24)
It will be useful to rewrite (24) in terms of a condition on ph(q) and ph(0). To this end,
notice that ph(q) and n(q,p0) are related by the following expression: n(q,p0) is the smallest
integer for which43
p0



























(1 − q) −
B
G(1 − πh)q
(1 − πl) − B
G(1 − πh)








Simplifying, we obtain the following suﬃcient condition for q to implement a welfare im-
43When there is no mixing in equilibrium, i.e., pm(q)=ph(q), the validity of this expression follows
immediately from the deﬁnition of ph(q) and n(q,p0). The fact that it also holds with mixing can be seen by
noticing that in such case the probability of success is greater or equal than when low eﬀort is exerted, and
so the posterior is ˜ pS(p,er(p)) ≤ ˜ pS(p,0). Hence n(q,p0) will be greater or equal than the term satisfying
(25). But n(q,p0) cannot be strictly greater, as this would imply that we mix for more than a single period,
which we have shown (in the proof of Proposition 1) cannot happen.
45provement as β → 1:
ph(q) < ˜ ph(q) ≡
p0(πl +( 1− πl)q)

















We now show that the condition on B/G stated in the Proposition ensures that we can
ﬁnd ¯ q>0 such that ph(¯ q) satisﬁes (26) and so we can achieve a welfare improvement. We
begin by providing a convenient upper bound for the level of ph(q).
For intermediate values of c, lying in the region where type b. equilibria obtain when
q =0 ,ph(0) belongs to (0,1) and satisﬁes equation (12) above. It is then easy to see from
the deﬁnition of this region in Proposition 1 that, when β is suﬃciently close to 1, c will
remain in the same region for any q>0.44 So for β close to 1, ph(q) also lies in (0,1) and
satisﬁes an expression analogous to (12):
c
πh − πl
= R − rzp(ph(q),1) + β(1 − q)˜ v
r(˜ p
S(ph(q),1),1;q), (27)
where, similarly to (12), ˜ vr(p,1;q) denotes the discounted expected utility of a risky en-
trepreneur with credit score p, when he exerts high eﬀort for all p0 >pand the contracts
oﬀered are rzp(p,1), highlighting the dependence of the utility on the forgetting policy q.
From (27) and (12) we obtain then:
−rzp(ph(0),1) + β˜ v
r(˜ p
S(ph(0),1),1;0) = −rzp(ph(q),1)+β(1 −q)˜ v
r(˜ p
S(ph(q),1),1;q). (28)
By a similar argument to that in the proof of parts a. and c. of Proposition 1, a (strict)
upper bound for ˜ vr(˜ pS
h(ph(0),1),1;0) is given by the utility of being ﬁnanced in every period
at the constant rate r = 1 until a failure occurs, while exerting high eﬀort, i.e., by
πh(R−1)−c
1−βπh .
Conversely, when the forgetting policy is q, a (strict) lower bound for ˜ vr(˜ pS(ph(q),1),1;q)i s
given by
πh(R−rzp(ph(q),1))−c
1−β(πh+(1−πh)q) , that is, the utility of a risky agent when ﬁnanced at the constant
rate rzp(ph(q),1) until he experiences a failure that is not forgotten, still exerting high eﬀort.
Together with (28) this implies that:
−rzp(ph(0),1) + β
πh(R − 1) − c
1 − βπh
> −rzp(ph(q),1) + β(1 − q)
πh(R − rzp(ph(q),1)) − c
1 − β(πh +( 1− πh)q)
.






46When β → 1, the above inequality becomes
−rzp(ph(0),1) +
πh(R − 1) − c
1 − πh
> −rzp(ph(q),1) +




rzp(ph(q),1) > (1 − πh)rzp(ph(0),1) + πh.
Using the deﬁnition of rzp(·,·) in (7), the previous expression can be rewritten as follows:
1
ph(q)+( 1− ph(q))πh
> (1 − πh)
1
ph(0) + (1 − ph(0))πh
+ πh,
or
ph(0) + (1 − ph(0))πh > (1 − πh)[ph(q)+( 1− ph(q))πh]+πh[ph(q)+( 1− ph(q))πh][ph(0) + (1 − ph(0))πh]
=[ ph(q)+( 1− ph(q))πh][1− πh(1 − πh)(1 − ph(0)]],
(29)
which is in turn equivalent to:
ph(0)(1 − πh)+πh > [ph(q)(1 − πh)+πh][1− πh(1 − πh)(1 − ph(0)]],
i.e.,
ph(0)(1 − πh)+πh
[1 − πh(1 − πh)(1 − ph(0)]]
> [ph(q)(1 − πh)+πh].
The above inequality implies that when β is close to 1 the following upper bound on the
level of ph(q) must hold, for all q:




[1 − πh(1 − πh)(1 − ph(0)]]
. (30)









[1 − πh(1 − πh)(1 − ph(0)]]
<p 0
(1 − πl) − B
G(1 − πh)




or equivalently that, for q close to 1 we have ¯ ph < ˜ ph(q).
Thus on the basis of the previous discussion we can conclude that there exists ¯ q yielding
47a welfare improvement over q =0 .￿
Proposition 5 — q =1optimal
Since pS(p)=p when q =1 ,q = 1 is optimal if and only if p0 >p h(1) and ph(1) < 1. To
compute ph(1), note that for q = 1 the continuation utility drops out of (12) and so we have
c




1 − πh(R − c
πh−πl)




So ph(1) < 1 if and only if c
πh−πl < (R − 1).￿
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